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Conceptualising the active welfare subject: 
Welfare reform in discourse, policy and lived experience 
 
 
Introduction 
Since the late 1990s, there has been growing scholarly interest in developing ‘notions of individual 
agency and subjectivity’, especially in relation to the ‘creative, reflexive welfare subject’ (Williams et 
al., 1999: 14).  Conceptual insights have evolved in parallel with an international sweep of welfare 
reforms, which have increasingly sought to reduce entitlements and intensify conditionality by 
individualising responsibility and mandating behavioural change.  The influence of the ‘incentive 
paradigm’ (van der Veen and Trommel, 1999) has been wide-ranging, affecting principles of 
governance and service delivery as well as policy design (van Berkel, 2010; Larsen and van Berkel, 
2009).  In the UK, successive governments have reinforced the goal of individual behaviour change.  
The UK Coalition government (2010-present), influenced by the libertarian paternalism of ‘nudge’ 
behaviour economics (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009; c.f. Jones et al., 2013), have attributed the difficult 
circumstances of welfare subjects to ‘wrong choices’ (Cameron, 2011: 1).  All of these developments 
have involved reconceptualising the welfare subject as more ‘active’ – albeit in different ways for a 
variety of purposes.  However, a substantial degree of ambiguity remains about exactly how this 
new ‘active welfare subject’ (Williams, 1999) is constituted and what this means for policy analysis.   
 
The aim of this article is to explore these differing conceptualisations of the active welfare subject in 
relation to users’ perspectives on the lived experience of receiving benefits and using advice and 
employment services in the UK.  It draws on the literatures on activation and welfare reform, the 
active welfare subject, agency and user empowerment.  It is in three sections.  The first identifies 
dominant and counter models of the active welfare subject.  Second, the in-depth qualitative 
research methods are outlined.  Third, the context of welfare reform is detailed.  Fourth, the 
dominant and counter models are compared with findings, based on data from 16 in-depth user 
interviews.  The article concludes by arguing that the dominant model is limited in several respects 
and that more effective policies could be developed based on the counter model and insights from 
users’ accounts of the lived experience of claiming benefits and receiving advice and employment 
services.  Its findings contribute to the international literatures on activation and welfare reform by 
identifying improvements to the concept of the active welfare subject. 
 
Constructing the active welfare subject 
There is no single agreed definition of the active welfare subject and perspectives within academic 
literature, policy and discourse are inconsistent and ambiguous.  Nevertheless, the image of the 
active welfare subject has been very powerful in both legitimising a particular type of policy change 
and in inspiring important developments in theory and research.  Broadly, two contrasting 
constructions of the active welfare subject can be distinguished:  the dominant deficit model, which 
views benefit recipients as inherently deficient and in need of intervention to become ‘active’; and 
the counter model that credits welfare subjects with already being ‘active’ and seeks to assert the 
voices and interests of competent yet disempowered actors.   
 
The dominant model:  active welfare subjects as ‘becomers’1 
Since the late 1990s, the targets of welfare intervention have been re-written in popularised supra-
national and national discourses of ‘activation’ (Crespo Suarez and Serrano Pascual, 2007).  Both the 
dominant discourse and policy detail have operated on the understanding that pre-existing policy 
responses to unemployment treated benefit recipients as ‘passive’.  This dominant deficit model of 
the active welfare subject, with its intrinsic exhortation to become more active, relies on a blanket 
view of welfare subjects as naturally inactive and in need of activation - either because of their 
                                                          
1 This distinction between ‘becomers’ and ‘beings’ was inspired by Ridge’s (2002) analysis. 
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perceived incompetency or immorality.  Here, the active welfare subject is a figure of aspiration, a 
transformation possible only via coerced self-improvement.  Despite its popularity, there are several 
problems with this construction.  First, it constitutes an historically inaccurate representation of the 
eligibility criteria and behavioural expectations of unemployment schemes, which have always been 
conditional on past work experience and job seeking activities (Sinfield, 2001).  What changed in the 
late 1990s in many OECD countries was that reductions in entitlements were accompanied by new 
policy instruments that made these conditions more explicit and in many cases more standardised or 
simplistic (van Berkel, 2010).  Second, the redefinition of pre-1990s social security systems as 
‘passive’ has strong implications in the enduring narrative of policy change, and for future policy 
possibilities, because it allowed ‘the problem’ to be redefined in more individualistic terms, 
minimising the structural causes of unemployment (such as global recession, changes in labour 
market conditions and employer demand) and facilitated a wide-spread moral denunciation of non-
employment, less fettered by concerns of capacity for work.  The significance of this version of 
events, which has now become embedded deeply in many parts of the world, is that it ‘robs us of 
the power to conceive of things in any other way’ (Crespo Suarez and Serrano Pascual, 2007: 108).  
Third, the suspiciously neat ‘passive’/‘active’ distinction detracts attention from the complexities of 
the purposes of social security systems and the lived experience of being at the receiving end of 
them. 
 
The notion of benefit recipients as essentially deficient is related to the influential, yet problematic, 
diagnoses of both Murray’s (1990; 1994) ‘underclass’ and Mead’s (1992; 1997) ‘welfare 
dependency’.  Murray (1994) presents claiming benefits as an immoral but rational alternative to job 
seeking that should be eradicated by reducing welfare provision; whilst Mead’s (1992: 133) view on 
intentionality differs in considering benefit recipients as willing potential workers who are ‘dutiful 
but defeated’.  Both analysts sought policy to alter the motivations and actions of benefit recipients, 
through deterrents or disincentives, in order to prevent misbehaviour, particularly in the form of 
freeloading.  In the UK context, these concerns have appealed to politicians across the ideological 
spectrum and have influenced social security and employment service policy design for more than 
15 years.   
 
Key contributions to the debate came from Giddens’ (1994:12) notion of the ‘autotelic self’, which is 
similarly transformative, with the implicit injunction to ‘be active’ in accepting individual 
responsibility for solving welfare problems.  However, this injunction is dislocated from 
consideration of the means by which benefit recipients could attain the prerequisite ‘ontological 
security’, ‘inner confidence’, ‘self-respect’ and ‘self-actualisation’ (ibid.) that might allow such self-
assured engagement with life’s challenges.  Similarly, Le Grand’s  (2003: 163-165) concern with 
empowering welfare subjects to be active ‘queens’ rather than ‘pawns’ was based on faith in quasi-
markets to harness the forces of competition to offer choice and enhance respect in ways that could 
be compatible with equity and altruism.  Indeed the appeal of rebadging ‘clients’ as ‘customers’ has 
influenced employment service delivery under all UK governments since the early 1990s, ranging 
from the Jobseeker’s Charter to the large-scale contracting out of job placement services in 2007.  
However, the idea that benefit recipients attending mandatory interviews can be considered as 
‘customers’ raises fundamental questions about choice and control (see below).   
 
Le Grand’s (2003: 25) notion of the individual knave ‘who pursue[s] their own interest by any means, 
legal or illegal’ also incorporates analysis of another prevailing construction of the active welfare 
subject within the dominant discourse - the welfare subject as individual self-seeking economic 
maximiser.  Although it is well recognised, even by behavioural economists themselves (Frey, 1999), 
that ‘rational economic man’ is a hypothetical model incapable of reflecting the full scope and 
complexity of real human decision-making, the idea has gained more purchase in policy design than 
empirical evidence warrants (c.f. Gregg, 2008; Halpern et al., 2004).  More recently, a purportedly 
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new and improved version of economic man as fallible and in need of pre-structured ‘choices’ has 
underpinned the liberal paternalist ‘nudge’ approach (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009), which has inspired 
a raft of conditionality and behavioural change initiatives in many areas of social policy, including 
social security.   
 
These approaches have been valuable in highlighting ‘the relationship between the assumptions and 
realities of human motivation and agency – [which] are crucial to the success or otherwise of public 
policy’ (Le Grand, 2003: 2).  However, the prevailing impression from the dominant view is that there 
is an association between the active welfare subject and self-interested wrong-doing, which requires 
correction by power-holding others whose own intentions are not open to scrutiny.  Thus, taken 
together, these different elements form a recognisable dominant model of the active welfare 
subject as a project in the making.  However, a multi-faceted counter model has also developed, 
which, as will be demonstrated below, offers greater depth of insight into the lived experiences of 
benefit recipients and forms the basis of an alternative view of the policy process and welfare 
reform.  
 
The counter model: active welfare subjects as ‘beings’ 
Over the last decade and a half, there has been growing scholarly interest in conceptualising and 
representing the subjective experience of benefit recipients in more differentiated and 
contextualised ways.  Several bodies of work have contributed to a counter model that credits 
welfare subjects with already being ‘active’, capable of making decisions and taking action, in 
contrast to the dominant model which sees being ‘active’ as a transformative state produced by 
coercive, punitive or quasi-market intervention.  Several authors have sought to improve previous 
conceptualisations, which tended to either underestimate the capabilities of benefit recipients, 
sometimes in potentially patronising ways (Fennell et al., 1988), or overemphasise their moralised 
misbehaviour (as above).  There are two main bodies of ideas that contribute to counter model 
understandings of the active welfare subject: first, politicised user empowerment; and second, the 
concept of ‘agency’. 
 
Active welfare subject as empowered user 
Concern with the politics of disempowerment, discrimination and (mis)representation is the starting 
point for those who have sought to establish terms of debate that reflect the perspectives of benefit 
recipients more accurately, respectfully and sympathetically (Fraser 2005; Lister, 2004; Williams, 
1999).  From this perspective, the welfare subject is active in the sense of being the competent 
expert in their situation, but is largely disconnected from the design of policies and services that 
impact on lived experience.  In effect, the shared goal of a range of perspectives contributing to a 
counter-narrative is to address ‘lack of voice, disrespect, humiliation and an assault on dignity and 
self-esteem, shame and stigma, powerlessness, denial of rights and diminished citizenship’ (Lister, 
2004: 7).  At the heart of the counter model (which incorporates insights from a range of standpoints 
including feminist, anti-racist, disability and anti-poverty) is the political positioning of welfare 
subjects, which incorporates the relational/symbolic as well as material and physical aspects of lived 
experience (Lister 2004: 7, Fraser 2005).   
 
An important component of the counter model comes from the political response of the Disabled 
People’s Movement (Campbell and Oliver, 1996; Charlton, 1998), which was borne out of ‘a deep 
sense of injustice fuelled by poverty, discrimination and social exclusion’ (Barnes and Mercer, 2006: 
1). User-controlled services and user-led action in health and social care have played a crucial role in 
reconceptualising the welfare subject as active and competent from an emancipatory democratic 
standpoint (Beresford, 2005) that ‘people have a right to participate and to be heard, to exercise 
choice, to define problems and to decide on appropriate action’ (Barnes and Mercer, 2006: 72).  
Although the focus of these debates was not initially or principally on social security, disability 
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activism led to ‘a radical critique of traditional social ‘care’ and welfare services’ (Barnes and Mercer, 
2006: 49), which rewrote and empowered service users as active welfare subjects.  However, there 
has been much criticism that the user involvement version of the active welfare subject has been 
appropriated by policy makers to justify a consumerist approach that confines the scope of change 
to technical or practical issues of delivery whilst leaving broader oppressive systems and power 
relations intact (Oliver, 1992; Beresford, 2005).  Being an ‘active’ user can translate as ‘influencing 
processes without influencing outcomes’ (Braye, 2000: 23).  In this way, the aim of giving voice as a 
route to empowerment can be subverted (Beresford, 2005) and reinterpreted as ‘empowering the 
powerless to adjust to the consequences of economic restructuring, without addressing underlying 
socio-economic and power structures’ (Lister, 2004:  174).  
 
Active agents 
Counter model understandings of the active welfare subject also relate to agency in social policy 
(Deacon, 2004; Deacon and Mann, 1999).  In this case, ‘agency’ usually refers to ‘purposive2 human 
action or behaviour’ (Deacon, 2004: 447), involving the study of motivations, decisions and the 
causes and consequences of personal action or inaction.  The issue of morality is acknowledged, 
since agency may be exercised to the detriment of self or others (Hoggett, 2001), but, crucially, the 
potential for malevolence is not confined to those actors currently claiming benefits.  Lister (2004) 
identified two axes of agency (see figure one below) exercised by people living in poverty:  the 
everyday-strategic dimension; and the personal-political/citizenship dimension.  Each quadrant 
showed a different type of agency from the personal/everyday ‘getting by’ (informal coping with 
regular demands and dealing with traumas - often not acknowledged as a form of agency at all); 
through the everyday/political ‘getting back at’ (resistance); and the political/strategic ‘getting 
organised’ (including campaigning and political action) to the personal/strategic ‘getting out’ (e.g. via 
education or paid work).  An actor may vary in approaches or occupy more than one position.   
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
 
Here, active welfare subjects exercise agency creatively and differentially but are located within a 
disempowering context of ‘Othering’, which promotes social distance between ‘them’ and ‘us’ 
(Lister, 2004: 101; Beresford and Croft, 1995).  The counter model offers more accurate 
understandings of welfare subjects by recognising heterogeneity, rather than relying on simplified 
homogenous categorisations or misrepresentations.  A core aspect of ‘Othering’ is the dehumanizing 
effects of large-scale stigmatisation that equates the shameful experience of poverty whilst claiming 
benefits with unapproved behaviours, which then may be absorbed into self-image (Lister, 2004; 
Oliver, 2001). 
 
The concept of agency has been most thoroughly developed by Hoggett (2000: 32), who promotes a 
nuanced understanding of self and agency that incorporates the ‘mutability of identity rather than 
its fixity’.  This has an affinity with certain feminist viewpoints which highlight collective aspects of 
agency, relating to the interdependency and collaborative construction of lived experience (Finch 
and Mason, 1993; Williams, 2001).  Agency is ‘profoundly enmeshed in shared expectations and 
accomplished in everyday life through interaction’ (Wright, 2012).  Hoggett (2001) highlights the 
differential impact of feelings (e.g. fear, doubt, hurt, pain, love) on social actors with fluid identities, 
navigating an indeterminate social world, within which life chances are nevertheless broadly pre-
ordered.  Hoggett’s (2001) model of agency  also moves beyond the binary positioning of welfare 
subjects within the dominant model (e.g. ‘passive’/‘active’ or ‘pawn’/ ‘queen’ or unitary sets of 
actors whose motivations and actions may be considered at a collective level, e.g. ‘workers’ or 
‘users’) by recognising the variety of positions possible in relation to how active one’s agency might 
be (self-as-object or self-as-agent) and how aware and reflexive one may be about that agency, 
                                                          
2 Although Hoggett (2001) argues that motivation and action may be non-purposive. 
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including the possibility of gaps between intent and action and action and awareness.    In this view, 
the self is neither unitary nor fixed (Hoggett, 2001), but dynamic, malleable and open to the 
influence of others -  emergent, contingent (Prior, 2009), relational and dynamic.  Hoggett (2001) 
distinguishes between the axis of reflexivity and non-reflexivity to recognise that social actors vary in 
their awareness of their motivations, choices and actions and the implications of these for self and 
others (including harm to others).  On the other axis, social actors vary in the extent to which they 
view themselves as ‘self-as-object’ or ‘self-as-agent’.  This highlights that whilst it is possible for 
welfare subjects to operate actively as agents, it is also possible to experience a collapse of agency, 
for example in cases of depression.   
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 
 
Both the dominant model and the counter model call for welfare subjects to be understood and 
treated as ‘active’, but according to different assumptions and towards different ends.  These ideas 
are applied (below) to interviewees’ accounts of their experiences of receiving benefits and using 
advice and employment services. 
 
Methods 
The data presented in this article were collected in 2008 as part of an exploratory research project 
on ‘Rights, Advocacy and Independence’ with the Child Poverty Action Group3, funded by The Baring 
Foundation and The City Bridge Trust (Wright and Haux, 2011).  This article reanalyses data from one 
element of the study, based on 16 qualitative interviews with adults receiving benefits.  The impulse 
to reanalyse was sparked by the observation that themes e.g. ‘control and choice’ offered rich 
insight into the lived experience of concepts such as ‘agency’ and the ‘active welfare subject’, which 
were not explored fully within the remit of the original project report.  Interviewees were accessed 
through seven advice agencies (two private providers and five voluntary agencies).  ‘Advice’ was user 
defined, including a broad range of information, advice, support and employment services (relating 
to benefits, tax credits and looking for work).  This covered a wide variety of types and sizes of 
organisation, including: mixed-sector agencies, housing associations, health professionals, local 
authorities, a telephone support service for tax credit claimants, a careers advice for service for 
young people and an MP.  All of the interviewees had experienced a range of provision, from 
Jobcentre Plus to small and diverse independent advice agencies.  Interviewees were selected to 
represent a variety of: benefits (Jobseeker’s Allowance, Incapacity Benefit and Income Support); 
household types (single and partnered parents and non-parents); and ethnicities (people from white, 
black and minority ethnic groups).  The small size and variety of the sample was intended to provide 
in-depth exploration of a range of experiences in order to identify key issues for future research.  It is 
not possible to assess the extent to which interviewees’ experiences were typical of a group to 
which they may be assigned (e.g. lone parents), so there is no attempt to generalise.  The study was 
not designed to select interviewees with multiple needs or those facing complex challenges, 
although it does appear that a high proportion of research participants can be described in these 
ways. Since benefit receipt is known to involve stigma and shame (Lister, 2004), interviews were 
designed compassionately to minimise emotional harm with sensitivity to the power dynamics 
between researcher and participant (c.f. Holloway, 2008; Wengraf, 2001).  The interviewer used 
empathy to ‘read’ participants and adapt the interview accordingly.  Although a minority of 
interviewees gave limited responses, the quality of the majority of the data reflects a high level of 
trust and rapport between interviewer and interviewee.  The research was approved by the 
Research Ethics Committee of the Department of Applied Social Science (University of Stirling) and 
conducted in accordance with the ESRC Research Ethics Framework and the British Sociological 
Association Statement of Ethical Practice.  
 
                                                          
3 Special thanks to interviewer Tina Haux. 
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Welfare reform context 
UK policy reforms over the last 15 years have followed two core principles:  the individualisation of 
responsibility and marketisation of delivery.  These principles share a behavioural change logic, 
which dictates that motivation and action of individuals (both benefit recipients and front-line 
workers) is the source of the problem, which can and should be changed in order to achieve the goal 
of ‘getting people off benefits and into work’ (DWP 2010a; 2010b).  For successive UK governments 
across the political spectrum, the priority of cost-cutting and belief in market values has outweighed 
research evidence in policy design (Newman, 2011).  This means that welfare reforms have 
developed according to priorities and principles that are disconnected from the lived experiences of 
being out of work, claiming benefits, receiving advice and seeking work.  Political consensus has also 
resulted in a firm anti-dependency discourse, which has consistently ‘Othered’ (Lister, 2004) the 
welfare subject.  
 
Although more work-focussed social security policies have been developing since the 1980s, it was 
the New Labour government (1997-2010) that developed welfare to work programmes concertedly 
(with a series of New Deal programmes for different target groups) and realigned the social security 
system towards more coercive conditionality based on the principles of ‘work for all’ and ‘work first’ 
(Lindsay and McQuaid, 2007; Lindsay and Dutton, 2013).  A new era of conditionality towards the 
end of New Labour rule saw benefits become more reliant on ‘citizens meeting certain conditions 
which are invariably behavioural’ (DWP, 2008: 1).  These reforms brought the biggest changes for 
lone parents and ill or disabled people, through reform of Income Support and the replacement of 
Incapacity Benefit with Employment Support Allowance – which have increasingly required Work 
Focussed Interviews and job seeking activities (Patrick, 2011).  These efforts have been endorsed 
and intensified under the UK Coalition government (2010-present) with policy direction taking a 
more punitive and behavioural turn (Jones et al., 2013), particularly evident in the Welfare Reform 
Act 2012.  A main thrust of this cost-cutting approach was the introduction of an all age benefit, 
Universal Credit, and the Work Programme, an outsourced version of employment services.  Both 
have served to extend job seeking conditionality,  now applied to all but the most severely disabled 
and carers of the youngest children, and to compel behavioural change on threat of harsh sanctions.   
 
The behavioural turn in conditional social welfare policies (Dwyer, 2008; Flint, 2009) also heightens 
pressure on the role and performance of advisers to implement ‘personalised conditionality . . . 
designed to influence behaviour’ (DWP, 2008:39).   From the late 1990s onwards, employment 
advisers in Jobcentres/ Jobcentre Plus offices and, increasingly, sub-contracted private or charitable 
agencies, have been expected to tackle benefit recipients about their perceived motivational and 
activity deficiencies in order to increase the frequency and intensity of job search activities.  Their 
role is to change behaviour in line with incentives and controls, to ensure compliance and to 
guarantee outcomes.  However, little is known about how benefit recipients experience information, 
advice and employment services, beyond official satisfaction surveys and evaluation results.   
 
Findings 
This section presents findings from the study, based on benefit recipients’ accounts of their lived 
experience in relation to the two conceptual models of the active welfare subject (outlined above).   
 
Choice and control  
The central question of this article is:  to what extent, and in which ways, is the ‘active welfare 
subject’ active?  Choice and control represent one of the strongest thematic couplets to emerge 
from existing academic literature, policy and discourse.   Debate continues about the extent to which 
benefit recipients have chosen the circumstances in which they live and the extent to which they can 
control the events and conditions to determine their own biographies (c.f. Johansson, 2007).  
Contrary to the dominant model, there was no evidence that interviewees had chosen their 
7 
 
circumstances purposively, or that their current difficulties could be attributed to ‘wrong choices’. 
The dominant ‘personal responsibility’ discourse does not adequately explain these interviewees’ 
lived experiences.  Rather, difficulties - associated with unemployment (16 interviewees); 
homelessness or severe housing problems (nine); disability or severe and/or unpredictable ill health 
(nine); or major care demands (10) - tended to be experienced as unwanted and unbidden intrusions 
into life plans.  Interviewees certainly did not consider benefit receipt to be a preferable state of 
living (as implied by Mead, 1990) – quite the contrary.  Many described a chain of events that led to 
no other alternative but to rely on the state for financial support in order to meet their own and 
their family’s most basic needs.  
 
‘I don’t think I feel in control.  Had I felt in control, I could do something about the situation.’ 
(Janet, homeless disabled lone parent) 
 
Interviewees’ accounts of their situations usually reflected feelings of powerlessness, rather than 
powerfulness, in which their choices had repeatedly been undermined by unpredicted events and 
processes that unfolded against their will.  In this respect, according to the counter model, 
interviewees inhabited the ‘self-as-object’ end of the spectrum, in contrast to the alternative 
conceptualisation of ‘self-as-agent’ (Hoggett, 2001).  However, it is important to note that 
interviewees’ lack of agency in relation to choice and control did not indicate passivity, since all of 
the interviewees described taking a series of tangible steps to change their situation.  Their accounts 
were of external denials of agency, which blocked their attempts to alter their life courses, rather 
than the type of internal inadequacy that is indicated by the discourses of ‘dependency’ within the 
dominant model.   
 
Struggling to ‘get by’  
Interviewees were therefore caught in the tension between what they knew in their own case to be 
an inappropriate dominant discourse of personal responsibility for ‘wrong choices’ and the 
emotionally demanding task of coming to terms with not being able to realise choice in self-support 
through paid work.  The counter model views this as an active exercise of everyday/personal agency 
in order to ‘get by’ (Lister, 2004), which fits with Janet’s account of the intensity of the unsustainable 
struggle at the margins of coping with everyday life: 
 
‘It’s like a fight with a huge monster.  And you are always scared that you are buried alive 
again.  Sometimes I can’t breathe when I think about it.  It’s like reaching for help and you 
can’t even feel the tips of the other fingers touching you.  Sometimes all that confidence, all 
that I gained . . . It’s like swallowing me.’ (Janet, homeless disabled lone parent) 
 
Another aspect of the everyday lived experience of benefit receipt, under-acknowledged by the 
dominant model, was the degree of unpredictability faced by some interviewees. For Mary, a 
disabled homeless woman, choice and control were alien concepts.  Her lived experience was 
characterised by flux in health, housing and employment.  Mary’s main concern was her health, 
which she could neither control nor predict – presenting a fundamental challenge to the rational 
actor aspects of the dominant model of the active welfare subject.  In the absence of the parameters 
of certainty, Mary struggled to exercise agency at the basic level of making sense of her situation 
and expressing it to advisers. 
 
‘I was living in and out of supported accommodation, I mean not easy at all.  I wasn’t able to, 
sort of, you know, I was in and out of work.  [. . .]  I was on medication at the time, which 
didn’t help my behaviour, you know, I wasn’t, sort of, a lunatic or anything like but you 
know, it’s kind of like a very, I mean I obviously knew about it.  I knew myself.  It is very 
difficult to deal with taking medication and stuff - like with drugs.  It is not nice. [. . .] I just 
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couldn’t sort of explain things in detail, couldn’t pinpoint what the problem was and sort of, I 
used to get confused and I couldn’t explain things properly. [. . .] You are relying on it 
[medication] to help your brain function properly.’ (Mary, disabled homeless woman) 
 
Mary’s mental health condition prevented her from knowing or trusting herself, which had major 
implications for her ability to exercise agency.  In this sense, the counter model notion of a ‘collapse 
of agency’ (Hoggett, 2001) helped explain Mary’s lived experience, whereas the dominant model’s 
emphasis on taking immediate action on threat of sanction seemed unrealistic and unsuited to her 
fluctuating condition.  The nature of Mary’s mental health condition and its combination with 
instability in housing, income and employment conditions, affected her capacity to make life-
directing decisions.  Mary’s difficulties in understanding and expressing her issues also reflected 
limitations to the reflexivity dimension of her agency (Hoggett, 2001).  Although she was looking for 
a job, it did not appear to be realistic for Mary to sustain independent living at the time of the 
interview.     
 
Thus the issues of individual choice and control, alongside the struggle to ‘get by’ highlight some of 
the complexities and ambiguities of the notion of the active welfare subject in lived experience, in 
comparison with the dominant and counter models.  The next section explores interviewees’ 
accounts in relation to the inter-relationships between personal agency and contexts of policy and 
practice.   
 
Mediating ‘activity’  
One crucial difference between the dominant model of the active welfare subject and the counter 
model is the degree to which personal responsibility is attributed to the individual.  As outlined 
above, the dominant model relies on a relatively homogenous view of welfare subjects as deficient 
and/or self-interested.  In contrast, the counter model highlights differentiated experiences within 
the context of politicised power relations.  This section considers interviewees’ perspectives as 
mediated by their experience of policies, systems and interaction with front-line advisers.  
 
Activity without results 
Many of the interviewees demonstrated clearly their acceptance of personal responsibility (as 
advocated by the dominant model of the active welfare subject) and identified a series of frustrated 
attempts to actively bring about change in their housing, health or job situations.  One interviewee, 
Janet, was a homeless disabled lone parent who cared for both her mother with dementia and her 
son.  Janet’s account of her experiences as a benefit recipient identified her as an already fully 
formed ‘active welfare subject’ (rather than an active welfare subject in the making, as implied by 
the dominant model).  Janet was reflexive, creative, highly motivated and taking action on several 
fronts, an exemplar of Giddens’ (1994) ‘autotelic self’.  Janet’s story was one in which she firmly 
rejected passivity in resolute determination to improve her situation through every means possible.  
Janet’s desire to engage with paid employment was very strong as was her intention to provide a 
secure home for herself and her son, who had been housed in ‘temporary’ local authority 
accommodation for three years.    
 
‘I am saying to the government:  ‘Hear!  Hear!  Listen to me!  I want to get a job.  I don’t want 
your benefits!  I don’t want them!’  I want to get a job and lead my life.’ (Janet, homeless 
disabled lone parent)  
 
Although Janet’s lived experience of claiming Incapacity Benefit as anxiety-ridden and pressurised, 
she was not ‘dutiful but defeated’ in Mead’s (1992: 133) sense because the source of defeat was 
external, rather than lack of self-actualisation.  Neither increasing obligations nor removing welfare 
provision could have prompted any greater effort.  Janet shifted between a strong assertion of what 
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Hogget (2001) describes as ‘self-as-agent’ until she was stopped by insurmountable obstacles, which 
then seemed to trigger ‘self-as-object’ responses, such as insecurity, powerlessness and feeling 
‘broken’.  Despite repeated active attempts to resolve the main areas of tension, she continued to 
experience poverty and debt and was not able to find a way to meet her and her family’s housing, 
health or income needs.  The complex nature of Janet’s situation also demonstrates the limitations 
of attributing ‘personal responsibility’ at a purely individual level.  The issues she described were 
inter-related and interdependent – both in cause and consequence.  Janet’s own wellbeing could not 
be separated from that of her mother or her son, which highlights the intersubjective nature of 
agency (a central feature of the counter model of the active welfare subject).  Furthermore, it was 
evident that the agency exercised by others to her detriment (for example her ex-husband’s non-
payment of child maintenance), affected the conditions in which Janet lived and had a bearing on 
her own ability to exercise agency. 
 
‘It’s a lot of a load. [. . .] The rent is £1200 per month. [. . .] I am a woman who wants to go to 
work.  I want to get a job.  But I am so scared because if I go, when I get a job, I am going to be 
depressed because of all that money I have to pay.  And he [personal adviser] said, ‘Well you 
know it all.  We can’t do anything about that.’  So I left the Jobcentre again with another brick of 
the wall piling up in front of me.’ (Janet, homeless disabled lone parent) 
 
In Janet’s case, the solution to her and her family’s complex needs was neither easily identifiable nor 
readily attainable, either through her own efforts or those of her advisers.  This highlights a 
misattribution effect in the dominant model used for policy design and discourse, which presents 
individual passivity as the main cause of benefit receipt and leaves little space to acknowledge either 
external contributory causes or gaps between actions and outcomes, where reasonable action did 
not result in the desired or approved outcomes.  The prescribed policy solution, of mandatory active 
job search, was neither necessary (since Janet was in any case voluntarily and concertedly seeking 
work) nor effective (since appropriate vacancies were scarce, competition for jobs was voracious and 
the security of contract and wages necessary to cover rent costs were elusive).  The impact of this 
combination of external factors far outweighed the effect that Janet’s own agency could have in 
altering her circumstances.  In effect, the intentions and actions of this willing, active and reflexive 
agent were largely irrelevant to the conditions in which she lived.  This constitutes a major challenge 
to the logic of the dominant model, which implies that ‘activity’ is a sufficient response.  Janet was 
acutely aware of this: 
 
‘The government has contracted these companies . . . who are basically to help you, trying to 
talk to you psychologically.  But when it comes to the concrete realistic fact of getting a job – 
there isn’t any.  Plus are we going to forget that we are in a huge recession at the moment? [. . 
.]  I am crying: ‘Help me’, but wherever you turn it is like a wall.’ (Janet, homeless disabled lone 
parent).   
 
This section has demonstrated how interviewees experienced limitations both to their ability to 
exercise agency and to the scope of the changes they were able to bring into being.  However, their 
lived experiences were also affected by aspects of policy and practice that operated more potently 
against their attempts to be active welfare subjects, as the next section outlines. 
 
Deactivating the welfare subject? 
Several aspects of policy and front-line practice appeared to operate against the dominant model’s 
goal of ‘activation’.  The policy context impacted on interviewees’ potential to exercise agency, for 
example, by setting living conditions in which the unyielding experience of poverty overshadowed 
the daily lives of those in the study. One of the foremost challenges was the impossible and 
unabating task of repeatedly attempting to meet basic minimum personal and family needs on an 
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insufficient income.  Poverty impacted on interviewees in ways that seemed to devalue and 
deactivate the ‘self-as-agent’ and promote a view of self more akin to the ‘self-as-object’. 
 
‘It was just really, really difficult and I just felt, you know, that I just didn’t matter.’  
(Dave, unemployed man)    
 
The fundamental inadequacy of benefit rates caused even greater distress for those who were 
subject to deductions (e.g. for debt repayments – sometimes incurred as a direct result of the 
below-poverty benefit levels) and, in one case, relating to a past tax credit overpayment.  There 
were three key insights that were significant to agency:  the psychological resources needed to 
confront the inadequacy of benefits; the emotional distress of added financial pressures and the 
lived experience of stigma. 
 
Interviewees varied in their attitudes, awareness and inferences in relation to the inadequacy of 
benefits and support.  Some were very reflexive and had insight into the power relations they were 
subjected to.  Many, already living in a state of crisis, expressed shock at the limitations of state 
financial assistance and support for those out of work.  For example, one taxpayer who had worked 
for many years prior to claiming, was taken aback to discover the bad terms and conditions of the 
social citizenship contract: 
 
‘Had you told me earlier in the year, had I known, had I known that I would be made 
redundant, but then there is nothing for me to fall back on . . . whichever way you look at it, I 
am really being had.’ (Miriam, lone parent) 
 
Being actively reflexive, like Miriam, exposed the lived experience of benefit receipt as an exercise in 
the acceptance of being subjected to state-organised, publically endorsed injustice.  Coming into 
contact with employment services and advice agencies thus constituted a practice of confronting 
exploitation.  The suffering that this caused was experienced as disempowering and, for some, 
deeply humiliating.  Thus, the lived experience of claiming benefits involved at least partially 
adopting a spoiled self-identity (c.f. Goffman, 1963). This aspect of receiving benefits seemed to 
impair, rather than empower, the potential to exercise agency.  Even those high on the ‘reflexivity’ 
axis of Hoggett’s (2001) model were pushed towards the ‘self-as-object’ side of the continuum.  In 
this way, the design of policies and their translation into practice can be seen to impact directly on 
interviewees’ internal resources and ability to develop self-determined action.  However, this is not 
to suggest that claiming benefits ‘saps character’, but rather that the active awareness of power-
infused social relations led to realisations that were of profound consequence to sense of self. 
 
Enacting ‘activity’  
The possibilities for welfare subjects to become active (as advocated by the dominant model) or to 
be recognised as active (as promoted by the counter model) were also mediated by street level 
advisers.  The factors conducive to enabling active agency were:  being treated with dignity and 
respect; being listened to sympathetically and attentively (ideally during long or flexible 
appointments); being understood; being appreciated holistically as a person; receiving consistent 
advice from a named advisor; feeling empowered and being ‘in control’ of the interaction; and the 
offer of direct assistance (e.g. with form-filling, especially for those with language or literacy 
difficulties).  Interviewees appreciated advisers who were: helpful and friendly; and competent and 
knowledgeable to assess their needs accurately and process their case quickly, correctly and 
effectively.  Although these preferences may seem self-evident, they highlight two key issues:  first, 
the contrasting dynamics and impacts of forms of advice that were based on these principles and 
those that were not; and second, the power of intersubjective aspects of agency.   
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Interviewees identified a range of advice/employment services experiences. For example, the 
dynamics of interactions based on being treated ‘like a person, an intelligent person’ (Dave, 
unemployed man referring to Citizens Advice Bureau services), contrasted sharply with those that 
involved being treated like ‘a different species ... [Jobcentre Plus advisers] think you are 
incompetent’ (Sandy, disabled woman).  In Dave’s case, the advice encounter appeared to promote 
‘self-as-agent’ (Hoggett, 2001), whereas in the Sandy’s case, the interaction left her feeling devalued 
and ‘Othered’ (Lister, 2004) as different and inferior, encouraging a sense of ‘self as object’.   
Interacting with advisers in various services could have a lingering impact on sense of self and 
motivation, which could either obstruct or enable ‘self-as-agent’ towards ‘activation’: 
 
‘They [Jobcentre Plus] don’t really care what I’m trying to say.  It really doesn’t matter what 
you’re saying.’ (Jasvinder, lone parent) 
 
‘She was a nice lady [housing association adviser].  She filled in the form for me . . .  She is 
very helpful.  She understands, when we talk, she understands more . . .  She will listen. She 
will sit down and she will talk and explain.’ (Ruby, lone parent)  
 
However, it is important to note that interviewees identified empowering forms of advice, and 
valued the support of named advisers, across the broad range of advice and employment service 
providers that they used.  Although the institutional context did have a bearing on the dynamics of 
the adviser-user interaction and the possibilities for empowerment, it did not entirely determine the 
potential for enhancing ‘self-as-agent’.  The range of services that interviewees accessed for support 
relating to benefits, tax credits and looking for work reflected different organisational goals, which 
can be compared with the two models of the active welfare subject.  At one extreme, mandatory JCP 
interviews are based mainly on the dominant model’s assumptions of the welfare subject’s 
motivations and behaviour, whilst at the other end of the spectrum, voluntary user-defined services 
(including advocacy) offered by charities like Citizens Advice Bureau were more aligned with the 
counter model concern for user empowerment.  Interactions within these different types of 
organisational context were also influenced by funding as well as ethos (e.g. JCP cost-cutting has 
reduced front-line advisers and the decision to minimise contact time has left little opportunity for 
the long flexible interviews  and direct assistance valued by interviewees).  The dynamics of 
mandatory advice (provided by Jobcentre Plus and some DWP-contractors) did not always support 
the welfare subject in being active: 
 
‘They [Jobcentre Plus] have got that statutory role and that just colours the whole 
relationship. [. . .]They were just focused on getting me back to work whether you were 
ready or not.’ (Sandy, disabled woman) 
 
In some cases advice was experienced as a standardised empty bureaucratic process without 
relevance to particular circumstances, involving hollow promises (e.g. of job leads that never 
transpired) or obligatory training that turned out to be meaningless.  For a minority of interviewees, 
being compelled to participate in inappropriate interventions could have a detrimental impact on 
their ability to be ‘active’ or realise ‘self-as-agent’ (Hoggett, 2001):  
 
 ‘A total waste of time.  [. . .]  This bizarre interview where I felt what was the point if I wasn’t 
entitled to anything anyway.  It was futile from the outset, but they have to.’ (Miriam, lone 
parent) 
 
It was evident that a range of factors in the design of employment and advice services and the 
interactional dynamics of the encounter could impact on agency – either to empower or to inhibit 
‘self-as-agent’.  Whilst the type of service and basis of contact (voluntary/user-defined versus 
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mandatory/standardised) did impact on the parameters of the interaction, it did not entirely 
determine the potential for the empowerment of ‘self-as-agent’ or the likelihood of action.   
 
Conclusion 
This article has considered the popular image of the active welfare subject in theory, policy, 
discourse and lived experience.  It has outlined two contrasting models:  the dominant model of the 
active welfare subject in the making; and the counter model of the active welfare subject as being.  
Each model represents a conglomeration of ideas and influences from a range of perspectives, which 
coalesce around distinguishable assumptions and approaches.  On the one hand, the dominant 
model tends to view the welfare subject in isolation as a unitary rational individual, personally 
responsible for their adverse circumstances (and for taking action to resolve them), with self-
interested or moral failings that need correction by harsh policy intervention.  On the other hand, 
the counter model is based on a view of the welfare subject as connected to others and influenced 
by shared expectations and the needs of significant others, situated within dynamic politicised 
power relations, with capacities for reflection and action, but subjected to ‘Othering’ and in need of 
empowerment.  The counter model also acknowledges that more powerful actors, including 
policymakers, also have agency, which can be exercised to the detriment of others.   
 
The findings presented here contribute to academic knowledge of the active welfare subject and the 
concepts of ‘welfare dependency’, ‘conditionality’ and ‘agency’ by relating abstract theoretical ideas 
to users’ perspectives of experiencing and enacting agency in the context of receiving advice and 
employment services.  Several aspects of interviewee’s experiences highlight the descriptive and 
explanatory inadequacies of the dominant deficit model of the active welfare subject.  This article 
has provided evidence that benefit recipients are ‘active welfare subjects’ in many respects (i.e. in 
taking active steps to look for paid employment and through reflexivity and self-actualisation).  
However, the evidence provided in this article challenges the extent to which benefit recipients may 
be considered solely responsible for detrimental situations that they have not chosen, particularly 
when the events and conditions influencing their experiences of being out of work and living in 
poverty were not within their control or influence.   
 
There is variation in lived experiences, both in user’s abilities to exercise agency in the sense of ‘self-
as-agent’ (Hoggett, 2001) and in their experiences of different types of advice and employment 
services in their implemented form.   
 
Existing dominant conceptualisations of the ‘active welfare subject’ are based on the idea of creating 
this ‘active’ transformation via conditional, residual, punitive or quasi-market welfare reforms (as 
advocated by several theorists, i.e. Mead, 1992, 1997; Murray, 1990; Le Grand, 2003). 
 
There is an active role played by oppressive policy design in triggering collapses of agency.  This 
highlights a key conceptual insight – that agency is neither fixed nor fixable.   
 
The ‘active welfare subject’ is disempowered by the ‘bad agency’ of others e.g. in policy design, 
implementation or the behaviour of others (e.g. non-payment of maintenance). 
 
It is essential that the concept of the ‘active welfare subject’ is informed by accurate understanding 
of personal responsibility, rather than over-inflating or misattributing responsibility.   
 
Merely demanding ‘activity’ on the part of the active welfare subject is an insufficient policy 
response, which does not engage with the key issues affecting lived experience. 
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The transformative dimension of the ‘active welfare subject’ is problematic because it is temporal 
and aspirational.  On the one hand, the dominant model charges the self of the benefit recipient 
with changing to create the desired outcome (gaining employment rather than claiming benefits).  
On the other hand, the counter model seeks wider social change to combat oppression created by 
politicised power relations. A key conceptual improvement, for both the dominant and counter 
models, is to accurately reflect what is, verified by authentic accounts of lived experience, rather 
than insisting on what ought to be.  This would allow insights about motivation and behaviour to be 
disentangled from prescriptions for reform.  The conceptual implication of the evidence presented in 
this article is that the notion of the ‘active welfare subject’ must incorporate, rather than ignore, 
welfare recipients’ immediate lived experiences of relative powerlessness.   
 
‘Activity’ is not a fixed state.  Self-actualisation can be affected by both policy and 
interactive/intersubjective practice, which may trigger deactivation. 
 
Benefit recipients may experience flux. 
 
This is not just a matter of perspective or ideology, but is central to an accurate understanding of the 
authentic experience of receiving welfare benefits and related advice and employment services. 
 
Furthermore, the findings presented in this article demonstrate the importance of contextualised 
social processes, since agency is created collectively and intersubjectively through human 
interaction.  This adds to theoretical understandings of the ‘active welfare subject’ by  
 
 
Self-actualisation is not an adequate solution to welfare needs.   
 
The active welfare subject, despite effort and self-development, may still meet a brick wall 
structured by systems and processes beyond their influence.  In this case, conditional or punitive 
policies may contribute to emotional distress and a collapse of agency, rather than enabling escape.  
 
In relation to choice and control, the dominant model held little explanatory power since  
 
Welfare reform has not enhanced the ‘autotelic self’ or fostered self reliance.  In fact, receiving 
inadequate income from benefits and being treated without dignity or respect (as was the case for 
some experiences of a range of advice services), undermined ‘ontological security’, ‘inner 
confidence’, ‘self-respect’ and ‘self actualisation’ (Giddens, 1994: 12).  Nor has the marketisation of 
employment services enhanced respect, created empowerment or ensured equity or altruism, as 
predicted by Le Grand (2003, 163-5).   
 
The counter model’s identification of different types of agency (Hoggett, 2001; Lister, 2004) was 
useful in understanding interviewees’ active struggle to ‘get by’ and their decisions and actions to 
find work and resolve acute needs in care, health and housing.  This gave insight into action without 
outcomes.   
 
These findings suggest that the notion of the active welfare subject is useful in understanding key 
aspects of benefit recipients’ lived experiences, but that there are a number of challenges for the 
dominant model that currently influences policy, discourse and employment services/advice 
provision.  Furthermore, there is scope to build on this exploratory study to develop new research 
on a larger scale, which investigates the meanings and impacts of a range of welfare conditionality 
measures in greater detail and over time.  This could offer greater understanding of the 
differentiated experiences of benefit recipients; further insight into the complexities of motivation, 
14 
 
the role of compulsion; the relationships between intentions, actions and outcomes; and evaluate 
the effectiveness of evolving welfare to work policies and practices. 
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Figure One:  Lister’s (2004) model of forms of agency exercised by people in poverty 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure Two:  Hoggett’s (2001) Model of Agency 
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